Is randomness necessary? – thoughts of the French enlighteners

Abstract

The article clarifies the relationship between necessity and chance in history, it is viewed through the views of prominent French enlighteners – the materialists Holbach, Helvétius and Diderot. Holbach was one of the first in the 18th century who identified necessity and causality by attributing randomness to phenomena which causes we do not know. In his opinion, everything in the world is rigidly and unambiguous defined; if we know the cause of the present event, then we can think that it will be the cause of the next and so on. There is not a single particle of matter, not a single person that would not be where they should be and they should act exactly as they act, for this had been determined by the preceding series of causes. Holbach’s views had outstripped the findings of P. Laplace, who described the alleged Demon, who knew absolutely everything in the past and the future.
It seems that the views of Helvétius, who defended the power of chance, refute the teaching of Holbach. But this is not so: if all that happens is necessary, then chance is just as necessary, and arguments of Helvétius are directed toward this goal. Helvétius focuses on education, proving that everything is determined by the case.
Denis Diderot, reflecting on the way of thinking of his friends, comes to the conclusion that the arguments of necessity turn out to be the justifications of randomness, and vice versa, i.e. move from the thesis to the antithesis, and vice versa, and, in this way, open up a special, non-Hegelian dialectic in their reasoning. This is the subject of his dialogues “Le Neveu de Rameau” (Rameau’s nephew) and “Jacques le fataliste” (Jacques-fatalist).
The reflections on French decisions make possible to outline the prospects for today’s researches of the problem. The works of V.S. Stepin have the great influence on the development of them.