The Aesthetic Experiences of Beautiful and Ugly People: a Critique

Authors

  • Mika Suojanen University of Turku (Finland)
  • Анатолий Липов RAS Institute of Philosophy

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21146/2414-3715-2024-10-1-86-105

Keywords:

aesthetic qualities, aesthetic judgment, experience, objectivity, perception, beauty, non-aesthetic qualities, critical theory, experimental philosophy, exercise of power

Abstract

The question of whether beauty exists in nature is a philosophical problem. In particular, there is the question of whether works of art, people, or nature have aesthetic qualities. Most people say they care about their own beauty. Moreover, they judge the appearance of another person from an aesthetic perspective, using aesthetic concepts. However, aesthetic judgments are not objective in the sense that experience justifies their objectivity. In this publication, which is a translation of a scholarly article, the author analyzes the theory of the American philosopher of art and one of the key figures in postwar American aesthetics, Monroe C. Beardsley on the objectivity of aesthetic qualities and explores the question of whether there are truly beautiful and ugly people in the world.

The attitude of analytic philosophers to evaluate people and art from an aesthetic point of view is subjected to critical reflection. According to the author, if there are no aesthetic qualities in the world, then no one can judge that someone is beautiful or ugly without oppressing them. Aesthetic judgments are manifestations of power.

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Author Biographies

  • Mika Suojanen, University of Turku (Finland)

    PhD in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science

  • Анатолий Липов, RAS Institute of Philosophy

    кандидат философских наук, научный сотрудник сектора эстетики

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Published

2024-06-30

Issue

Section

Man in the World of Art

How to Cite

1. Suojanen M. The Aesthetic Experiences of Beautiful and Ugly People: a Critique // Philosophical anthropology. 2024. № 1 (10). C. 86–105.